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SHATTERING AND MOVING BEYOND THE GUTENBERG
PARADIGM: THE DAWN OF THE ELECTRONIC WILL
Joseph Karl Grant*
INTRODUCTION
Picture yourself watching a movie. In the film, a group of four
siblings are dressed in dark suits and dresses. The siblings, Bill
Jones, Robert Jones, Margaret Jones and Sally Johnson, have just
returned from their elderly mother's funeral. They sit quietly in
their mother's attorney's office intently watching and listening to a
videotape their mother, Ms. Vivian Jones, made before her death.
On the videotape, Ms. Jones expresses her last will and testament.
Ms. Jones clearly states that she would like her sizable real estate
holdings to be divided equally among her four children and her
valuable blue-chip stock investments to be used to pay for her
grandchildren's education. Ms. Jones also provides details as to
how the remainder of her personal property should be distributed.
The videotape concludes with Ms. Jones stating that she would like
her oldest son, Bill, to act as the executor of her estate. Let's also
assume that two of Ms. Jones's closest friends are standing on cam-
era in the background, and after she has stated her devises and
bequeaths, they attest to the videotape as being Ms. Jones's last will
and testament. This image is not beyond the pale of imagination in
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terms of popular media imagery you may have seen in a movie, or
on a television program.'
Now let's ask and answer some hard questions. What happens if
Bill, the son of our would-be testator, takes the videotape to pro-
bate court in the state where his mother was domiciled to
commence probate proceedings? In virtually every jurisdiction in
the United States, with the exception of Nevada, the videotape
would not be admitted to probate as a will in conformance with
statutory requirements.2 The court would most likely refuse to pro-
1. One need look no further than to recent motion pictures like BREWSTER'S MIL-
LIONS (Universal Pictures 1985) and THIRTEEN GHOSTS (Warner Bros. 2001). For example,
in BREWSTER'S MILLIONS, Brewster is a minor league baseball player. After a bar fight, Brew-
ster and his friend are taken to jail. At his preliminary hearing, a man approaches and pays
for Brewster's release. Brewster is taken to a law office and informed that he is the sole heir
of his long-lost but extremely wealthy uncle. His uncle's last will and testament, shown on
videotape, stipulates that Brewster must spend thirty million dollars in thirty days. If he can
accomplish this task, he will receive three hundred million dollars. If he fails, he stands to
inherit nothing. In another movie, THIRTEEN GHOSTS, Arthur Kriticos inherits a house from
his uncle. The uncle records his will on videotape but is not actually dead. He leaves the
house to Arthur and his family because the house is haunted. The film's plot centers on the
uncle's intention to sacrifice Arthur and his family so that the ghosts in the house are re-
leased. See also Herbert E. Tucker et al., Holographic and Nonconforming Wills: Dispensing with
Formalities-Part I, 32 COLO. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 53, 56 (discussing reports of attempts to
make wills on phonographic records in the early twentieth century, and early movie depic-
tions of motion picture wills).
2. To illustrate this point, Professor Gerry Beyer provides a vivid example and expla-
nation of the difficulties associated with use of nontraditional wills:
Example[:] ... Steven made a videotape recording during which he carefully recited
the names of the individuals and charities he wanted to receive his property upon his
death. Steven also expressly stated that he intended the videotape to serve as his last
will. In addition, Steven stored an electronic copy of the will on a CD along with his
electronic signature and retinal scan. Does the videotape or the CD satisfy the writing
requirement?
Explanation [:] In the vast majority of states, it is unlikely that a phonograph record,
motion picture film, audiotape, videotape, computer disk, hard disk file, or CD/DVD
disk would satisfy the writing requirement for a will. In other contexts, the term "writ-
ing" is often defined as any "printing, typewriting or other intentional reduction to
tangible form." UCC § 1-201(46). The major obstacle in trying to fit a videotape or
other magnetic/optical medium within this type of definition stems from the deep-
seated historical use of the word "writing" as referring to something that can be com-
prehended by the human eye without the intervention of mechanical or electronic
devices. In 2001, however, Nevada enacted ground-breaking legislation authorizing
wills and trusts to be documented by electronic records. A strong policy argument
may be made in favor of new methods of evidencing wills because the purpose of re-
quiring a will to be in writing is to provide a permanent and reliable record of the
testator's intent and some types of modern media are more difficult to alter than a
written document.
GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 81-82 (3rd
ed. 2005).
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bate Ms. Jones's videotaped will because it does not satisfy the "in
writing" requirement. The videotape also would likely fail to qualify
as a will under state law because it was not "signed 3 by the testator
and the two witnesses did not attest to the alleged will "in writing."
Undoubtedly, the videotaped attempt to create a will would fail to
conform to the formalities required in most states. Similarly, in vir-
tually every jurisdiction in the United States, Ms. Jones's attempt to
videotape her will would not be considered a valid holographic
will.4 As a result, in most jurisdictions, Ms. Jones's estate would
likely pass through intestate succession, with the state ultimately
deciding through its statutes of descent and distribution to whom
Ms. Jones's real and personal property belongs.
We could change the facts slightly but nonetheless get the same
result. Let's say that all the essential facts outlined above remain
the same except that Ms. Jones records her will on an audiotape
instead of a videotape. Let's also assume everyone involved can au-
thenticate and identify Ms. Jones's voice as that speaking on the
tape. Again, Ms. Jones's audiotaped will would not be recognized as
a valid, conforming will. Nor would it qualify as a holographic will
because her wishes for her property after her death were not
placed in "writing."5 Ms. Jones's will therefore would not be recog-
nized by a probate court. This is not an uncommon scenario.
These hypothetical scenarios raise the question: what about tes-
tamentary freedom and the notion that the law should strive to
honor testamentary intent? A common refrain among preeminent
scholars is that " [t] he first principle of the law of wills is freedom of
testation."7 You may wonder, in our electronic and now digital soci-
ety, how can such a harsh end result? The answer is simple: "[t] he
history of the will as an institution of English law is a long and very
3. In this Article, I focus most squarely on and explore the problem of the "writing"
requirement. However, issues posed by the "signature" and "signing" requirements are
closely related and associated with the concept of what constitutes "writing" for purposes of
will execution.
4. A holographic will or nonconforming will is a will, written entirely in the handwrit-
ing of the testator, which is not witnessed or attested to by other individuals. A number of
jurisdictions recognize holographic wills as valid wills. In contrast, a conforming will is a will
that is in "writing" and that is witnessed and attested to by the requisite number of witnesses
under state law.
5. See, e.g., Buckley v. Holstedt (In re Estate of Reed), 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983) (re-
jecting the probate of an audiotape and its transcript as a holographic will). But see, e.g.,
Rioux v. Coulombe (1996), 19 E.T.R (2d) 201 (Que. S.C.) (admitting to probate the will of a
testatrix, under a Quebec substantial compliance statute, who had left a note to retrieve a
computer disk containing only one file that had been saved the same day she committed
suicide).
6. See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3.
7. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 489,
491 (1975).
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complicated story."' "The principle that people should be able to
devise their property as they wish, although deeply rooted in the
common law, has always described an ideal rather than a reality."9
The law of wills we follow in this country, as transmitted from Eng-
land over five hundred years ago, was first developed to address a
feudal society, then a society changed by the Industrial Revolution
and now, a post-Industrial Revolution culture."' The law of wills,
however, has been slow to adapt to these changing circumstances
and new technological modalities. "The law, founded on stare de-
cisis and cloaked in customs, changes slowly.""
The law of wills, however, has not been completely immune to
the march of technology. In 2001, the state of Nevada introduced
groundbreaking legislation providing for the creation of electronic
wills. 2 Nevada remains unique among all other jurisdictions in the
8. THEODORE E. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 732 (5th
ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1956).
9. Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033, 1037 (1994).
10. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 36
(6th ed. 2000), who illustrate this historical progression as follows:
Historically, in England, three courts had jurisdiction over probate. The king's com-
mon law courts controlled succession to land, which was the base of power in the
feudal system. The ecclesiastical courts controlled succession to personal property,
which, before the time of the Tudors and the rise of England as a trading power, was
of little value (cows, sheep, utensils, personal ornaments, and such made up the per-
sonal property of medieval life) .... With its flexible procedure and its power to
enforce personal duties, chancery gradually took over the administration of personal
property.
See also BEYER, supra note 2, at 16-18; PLUCKNE-r, supra note 8, at 742-43 (describing the
role of ecclesiastical courts and chancery courts in the succession process).
11. Lisa L. McGarry, Note, Videotaped Wills: An Evidentiary Tool or a Written Will Substi-
tute, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1187, 1187 (1992).
12. The Nevada statute defining an electronic will provides the following:
132.119. "Electronic will" defined
"Electronic will" means a testamentary document that complies with the require-
ments of NRS 133.085.
NEV. REv. STAT. § 132.119 (2007).
The relevant portion of the cross-referenced Nevada statute reads as follows:
133.085. Electronic Will
1. An electronic will is a will of a testator that:
(a) Is written, created and stored in an electronic record;
(b) Contains the date and the electronic signature of the testator and
which includes, without limitation, at least one authentication char-
acteristic of the testator; and
(c) Is created and stored in such a manner that:
[VOL. 42:1
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United States and is the only state with a specific statute recogniz-
ing electronic wills.
Indiana's wills statutes similarly recognize advances in technol-
ogy. While Indiana does not accept electronic wills, the state allows
videotapes to evidence the authenticity and proper execution of a
will as well as the testator's intent and mental capacity. 3 Videotapes
(1) Only one authoritative copy exists;
(2) The authoritative copy is maintained and controlled by the
testator or a custodian designated by the testator in the elec-
tronic will;
(3) Any attempted alteration of the authoritative copy is readily
identifiable; and
(4) Each copy of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as a
copy that is not the authoritative copy.
2. Every person of sound mind over the age of 18 years may, by last electronic
will, dispose of all of his estate, real and personal, but the estate is chargeable with
the payment of the testator's debts.
3. An electronic will that meets the requirements of this section is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of this State. An electronic will is valid and
has the same force and effect as if formally executed.
4. An electronic will shall be deemed to be executed in this State if the authorita-
tive copy of the electronic will is:
(a) Transmitted to and maintained by a custodian designated in the
electronic will at his place of business in this State or at his resi-
dence in this State; or
(b) Maintained by the testator at his place of business in this State or at
his residence in this state.
5. The provisions of this section do not apply to a trust other than a trust con-
tained in an electronic will.
6. As used in this section:
(a) "Authentication characteristic" means a characteristic of a certain
person that is unique to that person and that is capable of meas-
urement and recognition in an electronic record as a biological
aspect of or physical act performed by that person. Such a charac-
teristic may consist of a fingerprint, a retinal scan, voice recognition,
facial recognition, a digitized signature or other authentication us-
ing a unique characteristic of the person.
(b) "Authoritative copy" means the original, unique, identifiable and
unalterable electronic record of an electronic will.
(c) "Digitized signature" means a graphical image of a handwritten sig-
nature that is created, generated or stored by electronic means.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2007).
13. The Indiana statute provides the following:
Sec. 3.2. Subject to the applicable Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, a videotape may
be admissible as evidence of the following:
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have served as powerful evidentiary tools in will contests to demon-
strate the reasons for dispositions and disinheritance; to evidence
mental capacity; and to show a lack of undue influence over the
testator. 4 However, virtually all other states have refrained from
statutorily allowing videotapes or other electronic media to substi-
tute for a written will. The result is that in our "digitized" and
"electronic" society where computers, PDA's, and e-signatures rule
the day, the judicial system is nonetheless called upon to determine
what constitutes "writing"'5 and a "signature" for purposes of wills
statutes. The common law responses are often interesting and un-
predictable.1
6
Legislators in Nevada have already acted to modernize the law of
wills. This Article advocates that other states follow their lead and
depart from what is described as the "Gutenberg Paradigm" by
adopting similar legislation and embracing electronic technology.
Part One of this Article explores the history of print, Johann
1 ) The proper execution of a will.
2) The intentions of a testator.
3) The mental state or capacity of a testator.
4) The authenticity of a will.
5) Matters that are determined by a court to be relevant to the probate
of a will.
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3.2 (West 2005).
14. See, e.g., In re Estate of Peterson, 439 N.W.2d 516 (Neb. 1989); Hammer v. Powers,
819 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App. 1991).
15. Interestingly, recent amendments to Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial
Code are forcing lawyers to redefine and reexamine what constitutes "writing" in the face of
modern electronic transactions. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(g) & (i), 2-201 cmt. 1, 2A-
103(1)(i) & (k), 2A-201 cmt. 1 (2005).
16. For example, in Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), the Tennes-
see Court of Appeals addressed these issues. In Taylor, in January 2002, Steven Godfrey
prepared a document on his computer that purported to be his last will and testament. Id. at
830. Godfrey summoned two neighbors to act as witnesses to his will. Id. He also affixed a
computer-generated stylized cursive version of his signature at the end of the document. Id.
at 830-831. The witnesses signed their names and dated the doctment next to their signa-
tures. Id. In the document Godfrey devised all of his property to a person identified only as
Doris. Id. at 831. Godfrey died about one week after the will was witnessed. Id. Doris Holt was
Godfrey's live-in girlfriend who filed for probate. Id. Godfrey's sister, Donna Godfrey Taylor,
filed a contest claiming that Godfrey died intestate, and as his only blood relative she should
receive his entire estate. Id. Tennessee had a statute that defined "signature" or "signed" to
include "any other symbol or methodology executed or adopted by a party with intention to
authenticate a writing or record . .. ." Id. at 833 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(27)
(1999)). Based on these facts, the Court held that the computer-generated signature was
sufficient and that Godfrey's computer-generated document was a will because it was at-
tested to by two witnesses, thus meeting Tennessee's requirements for a valid conforming
will. Id. at 833. In terms of common law impact, Taylor should prove to be a very influential
case in the future. See Chad Michael Ross, Probate-Taylor v. Holt: The Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals Allows a Computer Generated Signature to Validate a Testamentary Will, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
603 (2005).
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Gutenberg's role in this development, and the emergence of the
"Gutenberg Paradigm." Part Two examines the history and policy
underpinnings of will execution formalities, and the role of the
"writing" requirement. Part Three explores the use of electronic
wills as conforming and nonconforming testamentary instruments.
More specifically, Part Three highlights some of the pitfalls and
shortcomings of the Nevada electronic wills statute and proposes a
model wills statute that could be adopted by states wishing to mod-
ernize their wills statutes to allow for the creation of electronic
wills. Part Three also provides other simple approaches for mod-
ernizing state wills statutes. Finally, Part Four outlines some basic
anticipated concerns and criticisms regarding electronic wills and
responds to those concerns and criticisms.
I. THE GUTENBERG PARADIGM' 7
In 1999, to mark the passage of the millennium, the A&E cable
television network ranked Johann Gutenberg as the number one
most influential person on their "Biography of the Millennium:
100 People 1000 Years" countdown. 8 Johann Gutenberg, a gold-
smith and inventor from Mainz, Germany, is credited with
inventing the first printing press sometime in the 1430s. 9 He is also
credited with being the first person to use oil-based ink.2 0 Guten-
berg began producing his famous 42-line "Gutenberg Bibles" in
1455,21 making his bible the first mass-produced book. Gutenberg's
introduction of the printing press in Europe had a profound effect
17. Thomas S. Kuhn has thoughtfully developed a coherent theory about "paradigm
choice" and scientific revolutions. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (particularly chapters V-X). Kuhn was one of the first scholars to
study paradigms and their revolutionary impact on science. According to Kuhn, paradigms
are defined as achievements that share the following two characteristics: "[t]heir achieve-
ment was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from
competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave
all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve." Id. at 10. Scholars
like Ronald Collins and David Skover do an excellent job of sketching out what they dub as
the "Gutenberg mindset" to explain and examine the legal profession's fixation on print. See
Ronald KL. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1992). Collins and
Skover advocate for the adoption of overlooked technology in the production of legal texts.
Id. Additionally, the progression from orality to print is discussed at great length. Id. at 514-
534. Here, I draw inspiration from Collins and Skover, attempt to pick up on and advance
Collins and Skover's initial work, and extend the conceptualization of the "Gutenberg mind-
set" into what I term the "Gutenberg Paradigm."
18. Biography of the Millennium: 10O People 1000 Years (A&E television broadcast 1999).
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on world history as it allowed news and information to move faster
and more efficiently.2  Literacy also dramatically increased as a re-
sult of the emergence of the printing press. "In the late fifteenth
century, the reproduction of written materials began to move from
the copyist's desk to the printer's workshop. 2 3 As historian Eliza-
beth Eisenstein noted, "[u] nknown anywhere in Europe before the
mid-fifteenth century, printers' workshops would be found in every
important municipal center by 1500. ",24 By 1499, an estimated fif-
teen million books had been printed in Europe, representing
thirty thousand book titles.2 ' Again, by 1499, approximately 2,500
26cities around Europe had established printing presses.
The impact of the printing press and publication on society has
been monumental. "Scribal culture could have neither authors nor
publics such as were created by typography."2 7 The print revolution
ushered in an irreversible cultural change that focused society's
concentration on written communication as opposed to earlier
modes of oral communication. 28 "The invention of typography con-
firmed and extended the new visual stress of applied knowledge,
providing the first uniformly repeatable commodity, the first assem-
bly-line, and the first mass-production."
29
As a society, we have moved from the printing press, to typewrit-
ers, and now to computer word processing. Paralleling this shift in
society, law has moved from an oral tradition, to a print tradition,
and now to an electronic tradition.30 "Any understanding of legal
culture is necessarily incomplete without some real appreciation of
the role played by its modes of communication, whether oral,
22. See generally ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE (2nd ed. 2005) (providing a groundbreaking scholarly and cogent discussion of the
impact of the printing press on early modern Europe); see also MARSHALL McLUHAN, THE
GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN 155 (1962, U.S. prtg. 1964)
("With Gutenberg Europe enters the technological phase of progress, when change itself
becomes the archetypal norm of social life.").
23. EISENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 3.
24. Id. at 14.
25. See Phil Ament, Inventor Johannes Gutenberg Biography, THE GREAT IDEA FINDER, Jan.
26, 2006, http://ideafinder.com/history/inventors/gutenberg.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2008).
26. Id.
27. McLUHAN, supra note 22, at 130.
28. McLuhan describes this cultural shift when he notes, "The manuscript culture had
not been able to duplicate visual knowledge on a mass scale and was less tempted to seek the
means of reducing non-visual processes of mind to diagrams." Id. at 159.
29. Id. at 124.
30. Id. at 31 (studying the emergence of print culture and humanity's shift from oral
culture to a print/media based culture). "The new electronic interdependence recreates the
world in the image of a global village." Id.
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scribal, print, or electronic.' Laws should not be static but evolu-
tionary by nature. Human nature requires that we look back and
honor tradition; but evolution requires that we look forward and
innovate to embrace the future and not be hampered and shackled
by our past.
In terms of institutions, the law has greatly benefited from
Gutenberg's introduction of movable type: laws became more visi-
ble and permanent. "Typography tended to alter language from a
means of perception and exploration to a portable commodity."
3
For the first time, "[t]he portability of the book, like that of the
easel-painting, added much to the new cult of individualism."33 The
introduction of printing publication allowed for the mass dissemi-
nation of the law to the body public. 4 Particularly in England,
where our Anglo-Saxon legal roots are based, the law moved rap-
idly: from an oral phase, to a scribal phase, and then to a print
phase.35
31. Collins & Skover, supra note 17, at 509.
32. McLUHAN, supra note 22, at 161.
33. Id. at 206.
34. Eisenstein illustrates this point vividly when she writes:
Similarly, as edicts became more visible, they also became more irrevocable. [The]
Magna Carta, for example, was ostensibly "published" (that is, proclaimed) twice a
year in every shire. By 1237 there was already confusion as to which "charter" was in-
volved. In 1533, however, Englishmen glancing over the "Tabula" of the Great Boke
could see how often it had been repeatedly confirmed in successive royal statutes. In
France also the "mechanism by which the will of the sovereign" was incorporated into
the "published" body of law by "registration" was probably altered by typographical
fixity. It was no longer possible to take for granted that one was following "immemo-
rial custom" when granting an immunity or signing a decree.... Struggles over the
right to establish precedents became more intense, as each precedent became more
permanent and hence more difficult to break.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 93 (citations omitted).
35. Eisenstein shows the rationalizing and methodical effect that printing had in Eng-
land in particular when she writes:
Publications of abridgements and lists of statutes issued by John Rastell and his son
offer a good illustration of how a rationalized book format might affect vital organs of
the body politic. The systematic arrangement of titles, the tables which followed strict
alphabetical order, the indexes and cross-references to accurately numbered para-
graphs all show how new tools available to printers helped to bring more order and
method into a significant body of public law. Until the end of the fifteenth century, it
was not always easy to decide just "what statute really was," and confusion had long
been compounded concerning diverse "great" charters. In "Englishing and printing"
the Great Boke of Statutes 1530-1533,John Rastell took care to provide an introductory
"Tabula": a forty-six page "chronological register by chapters of the statutes 1327 to
1523." He was not merely providing a table of contents; he was also offering a system-
atic review of parliamentary history--the first many readers had ever seen.
Id. at 80-81 (citations omitted).
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In stark contrast to the rapid adoption of printed text, substan-
tive areas of the law have been slow to recognize and adopt
electronic means of communication. Indeed, legal regimes still pay
deference to printed and written communications. In an influen-
tial Stanford Law Review article, Ronald Collins and David Skover
noted the following: "Whether, for example, in the formation and
interpretations of will or contracts, or in the review of court trials
and legislative proceedings, the law's primary instrument remains
the printed document. Wherever we turn, legal reality is shaped
largely by the printed word.
36
A paradigm is defined as an example, pattern, or model of
something.17 In scientific circles, a paradigm refers to "a worldview
underlying the theories and methodology of a particular scientific
subject."38 Law, not unlike mathematics, political science, history,
biology, economics, or chemistry, is an organized discipline that,
overtime, has developed its own underlying theories and method-
ologies. Therefore, to appreciate the legal profession's preference
for printed communications, we may follow the lead of the sciences
and attempt to understand this legal paradigm.
Thomas Kuhn, the scientific philosopher, defined and described
the creation of paradigms and their impact on practitioners in sci-
entific disciplines in his seminal work, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS.3 9 Kuhn adeptly noted and observed:
The study of paradigms ... is what mainly prepares the stu-
dent for membership in the particular scientific community
with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men
who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete
models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt dis-
agreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based
on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and
standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the
apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal
science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular
research tradition.0
For centuries, the definition of a will as referring to a written
document has been a persisting and underlying legal paradigm.
Generations of lawyers have been trained that in order for a will to
36. Collins & Skover, supra note 17, at 509-10.
37. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1232 (2nd ed. 2005).
38. Id.
39. SeeKUHN, supra note 17, at 10.
40. Id. at 10-11.
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be valid, it must be in "writing." The connection between a will and
"writing" has formed a pattern or model of what a will should look
like.4 ' The law has arrived at a comfortable consensus regarding the
"writing" requirement for wills. A clear paradigm has emerged:
printed text is the preferred means for memorializing an ambula-
tory document such as a will. Undoubtedly, "our legal consciousness
is still demarcated and mediated by printed texts."42 Essentially, the
law operates under what could be dubbed a "Gutenberg Paradigm."
The introduction of electronic technology and media, however, is
starting to chisel away at the Gutenberg Paradigm. Indeed, today's
legal profession-equipped with the internet, word processing pro-
grams, digital voice recorders, electronic discovery, email, and
electronic document filing-is rapidly embracing technology in
practice. The remainder of this Article advocates a paradigm shifte
3
to encourage substantive legal regimes, including the wills, to simi-
larly embrace technology.
44
41. Kuhn provides further insight into paradigm development and how this translates
into practice of a particular discipline. Kuhn writes:
To discover the relation between rules, paradigms, and normal science, consider first
how the historian isolates the particular loci of commitment that have just been de-
scribed as accepted rules. Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given
time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in
their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the com-
munity's paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By
studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the corresponding
community learn their trade. The historian, of course, will discover in addition a
penumbral area occupied by achievements whose status is still in doubt, but the core
of solved problems and techniques will usually be clear. Despite occasional ambigui-
ties, the paradigms of a mature scientific community can be determined with relative
ease.
Id. at 43.
42. Collins & Skover, supra note 17, at 509.
43. A paradigm shift is "a fundamental change in approach or underlying assump-
tions." NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 1232.
44. The term or notion of a "paradigm shift" was probably best described by Thomas
Kuhn. To describe how a paradigm shift comes about Kuhn observed:
[We] must first note briefly how the emergence of a paradigm affects the structure of
the group that practices the field. When, in the development of a natural science, an
individual or group first produces a synthesis able to attract most of the next genera-
tion's practitioners, the older schools gradually disappear. In part their disappearance
is caused by their members' conversion to the new paradigm. But there are always
some men who cling to one or another of the older views, and they are simply read
out of the profession, which thereafter ignores their work. The new paradigm implies
a new and more rigid definition of the field. Those unwilling or unable to accommo-
date their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other
group.
KuHN, supra note 17, at 18-19.
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II. WILL EXECUTION FORMALITIES: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Initially, the common law did not recognize the right to distrib-
ute real property upon death through a will.4 5 Nonetheless, every
state now recognizes and has granted to their citizens the ability to
devise and bequeath real and personal property upon death.46 Re-
flecting this shift, the United States Supreme Court astutely noted:
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased ... are of
statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by
sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the
legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the
power of testamentary disposition over property within its ju-
risdiction.47
"Although the state limits the power of testation in various ways,
within the province that remains to the testamentary power, virtu-
ally the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an owner is
entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in
life.,
48
The law of wills is arguably one of the oldest and most archaic
areas of modern law. 9 In most jurisdictions, the requirements and
formalities to execute a valid will trace their roots back to feudal
• 501
laws and codifications. Over the past five centuries, "[m] ost of the
45. See In reEstate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829, 831 (Wyo. 1983).
46. Professor Beyer notes:
Although not required to do so, all state legislatures have granted their citizens the
privilege of designating the recipients of their property upon death. A state legislature
could take away this privilege at any time. Of course, any legislator who voted to curtail
the ability of a person to execute a will would be highly unlikely to be reelected!
GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 71 (4th ed.
2007).
47. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
48. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 491 (citations omitted).
49. See PLUCKNE I 1, supra note 8.
50. Plucknett illustrates this point when he writes:
Henry VIII's statutes made no requirements as to the form of a will save that it be in
writing, and it was not until the Statute of Frauds that this and a good many other
matters were required to be expressed in writing, signed, and in the case of wills wit-
nessed. The Statute of Frauds also required written documents for the creation of
trusts of land, and for the assignment of all sorts of trusts, and therefore contributed
a great deal towards the treatment of these equitable interests as though they were
property. A mass of very unsatisfactory law, mainly the work of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, was swept away by the Wills Act, 1837.
Id. at 616-17.
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substantive principles of the law of due execution were established
by early English statutes, which were, in turn, the model for Ameri-
can wills formalities statutes."' The law of wills traces its earliest
origins back to the English Statute of Frauds of 1677. Eventually,
most early American jurisdictions codified, in some form or an-
other, the requirements of the Statute of Frauds to govern the
execution and validity of wills. "For over three hundred years, wills
have been defined by their formal qualities. The details have var-
ied, but the essential formal requirements-writing, signature, and
attestation-have remained constant and inviolate.'
52
The British Parliament passed the Statute of Frauds in 1677 in
order to abolish oral inter vivos or testamentary transfers of real
property. The English Parliament thought that oral transfers of
real property were often underlined by fraud and upheld in court
by perjury.53 Indeed, the preamble to the Statute of Frauds reflects
its purpose, noting that it is an act "[flor prevention of many
fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavoured to be up-
held by perjury and subordination of perjury. "54 As it pertains to
wills, the Statute of Frauds provides that "all devises and bequests
of any lands.., shall be in writing and signed by the party so devis-
ing the same or by some other person in his presence and by his
express directions and shall be attested and subscribed in the pres-
ence of the said devisor by three or four credible witnesses or else
they shall be utterly void and of none effect.', 55 In England, for
nearly two hundred years, the Statute of Frauds established the
minimum requirements that a testator had to satisfy in order to
devise his real property in accordance with the law.56
Some U.S. states have modeled their wills statutes on the Statute
of Frauds.57 These statutes require that a will be in writing and
signed or "subscribed" to by the testator or another person acting
as the testator's proxy in the testator's presence, and at his or her
direction. s Courts have interpreted these statutes to require that
the testator's signature, or the signature of one acting on the
51. EUNICE L. Ross & THOMASJ. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 2:11 (2nd ed. 1999).
52. Mann, supra note 9, at 1035.
53. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.1, at 354 (4th ed. 2004).
54. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.).
55. Id. at c. 3, § 5.
56. A number of American states use the English Statute of Frauds as the model for
their will statutes. See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 10, at 226. Interestingly, transfers
of personal property were handled in ecclesiastical courts in England. See id. at 36.
57. See infra notes 94 and 95, for a list of states that follow the model of the English
Statute of Frauds.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 cmt.j (1999).
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testator's behalf, be placed at the end of the will.59 Wills statutes of
this variety principally require that the will be signed by two wit-
nesses in the presence of the testator."0
After the Statute of Frauds, the law of wills evolved to embrace
greater regulation. The British Wills Act of 1837 codified addi-
tional formalities, going beyond the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. In pertinent part, the Wills Act of 1837 provides:
No will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing, and exe-
cuted ... it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by the
testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his
direction; and such signature shall be made or acknowledged
by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses pre-
sent at the same time, and such witnesses shall attest and
subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form
of attestation shall be necessary."
Therefore, under the Wills Act, for a will to be valid required that:
1) the will be "in writing; 2) and signed "in writing" by the testator
or by another person at his or her direction, in the presence of the
testator, at the foot or end of the will; 3) in front of at least two wit-
nesses; 4) who attest, in any form, to the will's validity.
Thus, the most notable formalities of the Wills Act are the re-
quirements that the testator sign "at the foot or end"62 of the will;
the testator's acknowledgement of the will in the presence of fewer
witnesses; and attestation and subscription by the proper number
of witnesses.63 Some U.S. states have looked to the Wills Act of 1837
as a model for their wills statutes.64
In contrast to the Statute of Frauds, wills statutes modeled on
the Wills Act of 1837 require that a will be in writing and signed at
the end or "foot" by the testator, or by some other person, acting
on the testator's behalf in the testator's presence, or at the testa-
tor's direction.65 These statutes also require that the testator sign or
acknowledge the will in the presence of two witnesses, and that the
witnesses sign in the presence of the testator and in the presence
of each other.
66
59. Id. § 3.1 cmts.j-k.
60. Id. § 3.1 cmt. o.
61. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Wm. 4 & I Vict., c. 26, § 9 (Eng.).
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 cmt. 1(1999).
63. See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 10, at 226.
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 cmt. 1(1999).
66. Id. § 3.1 cmt. p.
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In addition to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and
English Wills Act, several states also require that the testator "pub-
lish"67 or declare to the witnesses that the document is the testator's
will. There are nine states with this publication requirement••8
Despite the differences among the historical will statutes, in
most jurisdictions, a valid will requires that the testator satisfy the
following four requirements:(1) legal capacity; (2) testamentary
capacity; (3) testamentary intent; and (4) the statutory formalities
required in the jurisdiction. Legal capacity requires that the testa-
tor be eighteen years or older.69 Testamentary capacity requires that
the testator be of sound mind. °
Testamentary intent requires that the testator intend the will to
be the final disposition of the testator's real or personal property
upon his or her death.7' Modern approaches, such as the Uniform
Probate Code,72 embrace many of the features of the Statute of
Frauds but dispense with some of the formalities of the Wills ActS 71
regarding due execution. In some respects, the Uniform Probate
Code harmonizes, updates and simplifies the probate process. For
example, the Original Uniform Probate Code of 1990 sets forth
67. See generally id. § 3.1 cmt. h.
68. States that require that the testator publish or declare their will include: Arkansas,
California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (West 2008); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (West 2008); IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3(a) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.279 (West 2008); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 55 (West 2008);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (2008). The Cali-
fornia statute does not explicitly require that the testator "publish" or declare that the
instrument to be wimessed is their will. California, does however, require that the witnesses
understand that the instrument that they are signing is the testator's will. CAL. PROB. CODE §
6110. Louisiana's requirements effect what are known as mystic testaments under the statu-
tory requirements. "Mystic testaments" are wills recognized under Louisiana's civil code that
require a notary's seal in order to be valid. LA. CIxv. CODE ANN. art. 2885 (2008). Pennsyl-
vania's statute requires "publication" only where another person signs the will in the
presence or at the direction of the testator. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502.
69. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (2006).
70. Id.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 cmt. g (1999) ("To be a will, the docu-
ment must be executed by the decedent with testamentary intent, i.e., the decedent must
intend the document to be a will or to become operative at the decedent's death.").
72. The Uniform Probate Code was promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1969. It underwent substantial revisions in 1975,
1982, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2002, and 2003. The Uniform Probate Code and
its revisions have been adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. It was introduced for adoption in Mas-
sachusetts in 2008. The Uniform Probate Code was designed to update and simplify state
probate laws. See generally UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE (2002), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-
fs-upc.asp.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 cmt. f (1999).
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three major requirements for a will to be validly executed: (1) the
will must be in writing; (2) the will must be signed by the testator
or in the testator's name by some other person in the testator's
conscious presence or at the testator's direction; and (3) the will
must be signed by at least two witnesses who witnessed at least one
of the following events: (a) the signing of the will; (b) the testator's
acknowledgement of the signature; or (c) the testator's acknowl-
edgement of the will itself. The Revised Uniform Probate Code
also requires that these three elements be satisfied." However, the
Revised Uniform Probate Code includes an additional require-
ment that compels the witnesses to sign the will within a reasonable
time after observing the signing of the will or acknowledgement by
the testator. In addition, the Revised Uniform Probate Code con-
tains a subsection governing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
to establish the testator's testamentary intent.
As for formalities, virtually all jurisdictions also require that a
will be: (1) in writing; (2) signed by the testator, or in the testator's
name by some other individual in the testator's conscious pres-
ence, and at the testator's direction; and (3) attested to or signed
by at least two witnesses within a reasonable time after the testator
signs or acknowledges his signature or the will generally. 1 "A will is
validly executed if it is in writing and is signed by the testator and
by a specified number of attesting witnesses under procedures pro-
vided by applicable law.,76 As one commentator has noted:
There has always been a hierarchy of formalities, which courts
refuse to admit. Writing, for example, is indispensable. The
testator's signature is also essential, but courts sometimes
fudge what they will accept as a signature and where on the
document it may appear. They are more liberal in what they
will consider attestation, particularly in terms of what consti-
tutes "presence." Yet whenever courts stretch the definitions
of signature and attestation, they always maintain that the
variant they are accepting is compliance-not the functional
equivalent, but actual compliance.77
In most states, the testator must strictly comply with the statutory
requirements. For example, in Ohio, which follows the English
Wills Act of 1837, the testator must comply with the statute by sign-
74. The Revised Uniform Probate Code was adopted by The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1991. See supra note 72.
75. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (2006).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 (1999).
77. Mann, supra note 9, at 1040-41 (citations omitted).
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ing their will at the end, or by having someone else sign at their
direction and in their presence, and have two or more witnesses
see the testator sign or hear acknowledgement of the testator's sig-
nature.8
Several states, however, have adopted the substantial compliance
doctrine articulated in § 2-503 of the Uniform Probate Code.79 The
substantial compliance doctrine allows probate courts to excuse
will deficiencies using a "harmless error standard." Under this
standard, where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that
the testator intended the instrument submitted for probate to be
his or her will, failure to comply with formalities-such as a partial
or complete revocation, an addition to or alteration, or a partial or
complete revival of a formerly revoked will-will not preclude dis-
position.80 "By subordinating the formalities and their functions to
the testator's intent, the dispensing power frees courts from the
fiction that the formalities are of equal weight and importance. As
a consequence, courts can treat minor defects in execution as just
that-minor defects that need not invalidate a will."8
"The formal requirements for wills enable probate to function as
an administrative process rather than a judicial one in the crucial
initial determination of whether or not a writing is a will.8s2 Fur-
thering this administrative role, there are four distinct public
policy concerns that underlie and are served by will formalities: the
evidentiary, cautionary, protective and channeling functions.83
The evidentiary function seeks to produce credible evidence re-
lated to the existence and content of the testator's will. 84 As
Professor Langbein has noted, the primary purpose of statutory
formalities has always been "to provide the court with reliable evi-
dence of testamentary intent and of the terms of the will."
85
The cautionary function ensures that the testator arrived at his
or her dispositive decisions with measured forethought and aware-
ness.86 "The requirements of writing and signature, which have
78. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2008).
79. States that have adopted the substantial compliance doctrine include Colorado,
Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, and Utah. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-502
(2008); HAW. REv. STAT. § 560:2-502 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502 (West
2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-502 (2008); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-502 (2008); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.3 cmts. a-c
(1999).
80. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2006).
81. Mann, supra note 9, at 1040 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 1048.
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.3 cmt. a (1999).
84. Id.
85. Langbein, supra note 7, at 492.
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.3 cmt. a (1999).
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such major evidentiary significance, are also the primary caution-
ary formalities. Writing is somewhat less casual than plain
chatter. "7
The protective function strives to ensure that the will itself, and
its execution, are the by-product of the testator's free will.8 8 "The
requirement that attestation be made in the presence of the testa-
tor is 'meant to prevent the substitution of a surreptitious will.'
Another common protective requirement is the rule that the wit-
nesses should be disinterested, hence not motivated to coerce or
deceive the testator."89
Ask most estate planning attorneys and they will tell you that
preparation and execution of a will is a process fraught with ritual-
ism and formality. In some instances, execution of a will for a client
is akin to a small-scale corporate closing. Essentially, "[w]ills have
always been creatures of form rather than substance."9 ° During the
past fifty years, scholars, and in turn legislators in a number of ju-
risdictions, with varying success, have attempted to streamline a
number of will formalities that have become entrenched and
nearly immutable features of our shared Anglo-Saxon legal tradi-
tion.9
The Uniform Probate Code is a testament to these reform ef-
forts. In the 1990s, the Uniform Probate Code and its revisions
appeared. "The Uniform Probate Code generally adopts the less
strict requirements of the Statute of Frauds but reduces the re-
quired number of witnesses to two." 92 With very little exception,
most states require two witnesses.93
Today, most states have adopted wills statutes that substantively
follow several variants: (1) the model of the English Statute of
Frauds of 1677; (2) the model of the English Wills Act of 1837; (3)
the model of the Original Uniform Probate Code of 1990; (4) the
model of the Revised Uniform Probate Code; or (5) a model that
can be termed as "unique," to govern the execution of wills by tes-
tators in that particular jurisdiction. There are, therefore, five
87. Langbein, supra note 7, at 495.
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.3 cmt. a (1999).
89. Langbein, supra note 7, at 496 (citations omitted).
90. Mann, supra note 9, at 1035.
91. Id. at 1036 ("Section 2-503 [of the Uniform Probate Code] is the most recent salvo
in a long campaign against formalism in wills adjudication, the roots of which go back over
fifty years. It is important to remember that the target of the campaign has always been for-
malism rather than the formalities themselves.") (citations omitted).
92. SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 203 (7th ed. 2005); see
also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (2006).
93. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 10, at 226. Vermont requires "two or
more credible wimesses." See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (2007). Louisiana requires a notary
public's seal with regard to "mystic testaments." SeeLA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2885 (2008).
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principle types of will acts in the United States. Sixteen states have
enacted wills statutes that are modeled on the English Statute of
Frauds of 1677.94 The District of Columbia also has a wills statute
that mimics the Statute of Frauds. 5 Fourteen states have wills stat-
utes that closely resemble the model of the English Wills Act of
1837.96 Seven states have enacted will statutes that are modeled on
the Original Uniform Probate Code of 1990. 97 Eleven states have
enacted wills statutes that are substantially modeled on the Revised
Uniform Probate Code.9 Finally, Pennsylvania9 and Louisiana'0
have enacted "unique" wills statutes that substantially differ from
the Statute of Frauds of 1677, the English Wills Act of 1837, the
Original Uniform Probate Code of 1990 and the Revised Uniform
Probate Code models.
94. These sixteen states include Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See CONN. GEN. STAr. ANN. § 45a-251 (West 2008);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 202 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-20 (2008); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/4-3 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.279 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 4-102 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1 (2008); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1
(West 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.320 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.040 (West
2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.235 (2008); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (2008); WISc. STAT. § 853.03
(2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-112 (2008).
95. D.C. CODE § 18-103 (2008).
96. These fourteen states include Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and
West Virginia. SeeARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.502 (West
2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-606 (2007); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (West 2008); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney
2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.3 (2008); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2008); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 55 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-5 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-
1-104 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 64:1-49 (2008); and
W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (2008).
97. These seven states include Alabama, California, Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, NewJer-
sey, and South Carolina. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-131 (1991); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (West
2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-502 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 2-502 (2008);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2327 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2 (West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-502 (2008).
98. These eleven states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah. See ALASKA STAT. §
13.12.502 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2502 (2008); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-502
(2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-502 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502 (West
2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-502 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522 (2008); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-502 (West 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-2-502(b) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-502 (2008).
99. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 2008).
100. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1574 (2008).
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III. ELECTRONIC WILLS As CONFORMING OR NONCONFORMING
TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS
A. Pitfalls and Shortcoming in the Nevada Electronic Wills Act
The Nevada law creating electronic wills was implemented with
several factors in mind. First, it was created to provide convenience
to testators wishing to create a will.'0 ' Second, it was geared toward
technology-oriented citizens who lead digitized lives.102 Third, legis-
lators in Nevada realized the changing nature of society.
Specifically, Nevada legislators recognized that going forward, most
legal transactions would be executed electronically and that Ne-
vada could seize upon the opportunity to be a leader in thisS 104
revolution.
The Nevada statute that allows for electronic wills is a ground-
breaking piece of legislation. It is no doubt the first step toward
making electronic wills a reality in the United States. It will be in-
teresting to see how many other jurisdictions will follow Nevada's
lead and adopt similar legislation. Nonetheless, the Nevada elec-
tronic wills statute is not perfect. There are several flaws that leave
room for improvement. In particular, the statute's language and
structure can be difficult to comprehend, and therefore, to im-
plement.
First, definitions of key and integral terms are scattered
throughout the various sections of the statute. For example, the
term "electronic will" is defined outside of the main section that
provides for the creation of electronic wills.'0 5 Additionally, other
key terms and concepts like "electronic signature"' and "elec-
tronic record"' 7 are defined in still separate sections of the
legislation. Further, other key terms and concepts like "authentica-
tion characteristic," "authoritative copy," and "digitized signature"
are defined for the first time in the main body of the statute that
authorizes use of electronic wills. This scattering of key definitions
detracts from the cogency and readability of the statute overall.
101. See Gerry W. Beyer and Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Comefor Wills




105. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 132.119 (2007), which defines an "Electronic will" as a testa-
mentary document that complies with the requirements of NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085
(2007).
106. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 132.118 (2007).
107. SeeNEv. REv. STAT. § 132.117 (2007).
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Second, the Nevada statute lacks a purpose section that clearly
articulates why the statutory regime is necessary. Furthermore, no
legislative directive is provided to the judiciary for how to interpret
the statutory enactment. The Nevada courts are not directed as to
whether or not they should narrowly or liberally construe the elec-
tronic wills statute and the scope of testamentary intent.
Third, the Nevada statute does not clearly define the term "elec-
tronic record.' 08 The Nevada statute generically defines an
"electronic record" as a "record created, generated or stored by
electronic means."'09 The words "electronic means" are nebulous,
and do not clearly delineate what types of electronic or digital me-
dia or technology are permissible or preferred. Testators take an
enormous risk if the technology used to create an electronic will is
later invalidated or deemed unacceptable. In essence, this leaves a
testator without guidance as to what electronic medium is accept-
able.
Similarly, the Nevada statute also does not address the mecha-
nism by which a testator can make an electronic will (i.e., a
videotape, audiotape, computer-generated will with an electronic
signature, etc.) in a traditional "conforming" sense with acknowl-
edgement and attestation before two or more witnesses. Moreover,
the Nevada electronic wills statute does not address how to treat
electronic wills that are not witnessed by the proper number of at-
testing witnesses or notary publics. These types of wills could
potentially be viewed as electronic wills that are similar to tradi-
tional holographic wills or nonconforming wills-wills that are
entirely in the handwriting of the testator but not attested to by
witnesses.
B. A Call to Action: A Proposal for a Model Electronic Wills Act
The adoption of electronic wills in Nevada reflects the need to
reform the law to eliminate the barriers to electronic will creation.
Due to the fact that the Nevada electronic wills statute only applies
in that jurisdiction and encompasses the unique legislative and ju-
dicial experiences of that state, it fails to provide a systematic
approach that could be adopted by other states. A uniform ap-
proach that recognizes and provides for conforming and
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A multi-layered legislative formulation would serve as a source of
guidance for estate planning practitioners, testators, and the
courts.10 A clear and direct legislative regime would fully and ex-
pressly set forth the requisite formalities, burdens of proof where
formalities are lacking, and purposes and principles of construc-
tion necessary to carry out a testator's dying wishes through an
electronic will. "1 ' Where compliance with the formalities is defec-
tive or lacking, the legislative regime should be flexible and
provide standards that can be applied efficiently by the courts to
determine which acts or actions by a testator are sufficient to estab-
lish testamentary intent. 112 One would not need to rank the
requisite formalities, but instead, the focus would be on the overall
objective manifestation of the testator's expressed and implied in-
tentions with respect to the disposition and distribution of his
estate.'13
This Article endeavors to provide a model statutory regime that
would allow for the use of electronic wills. Ideally, a model statu-
tory enactment would begin with a purpose and construction
section that would serve as a guide for the courts with regard to the
interpretation and application of the statute-a glaring shortcom-
ing in the current Nevada electronic wills statute. Inclusion of such
a section would highlight and clarify the underlying public policy
aims of the statute. A model statute would also include a section,
early in sequence, that clearly defines the key terms and concepts.
The types of acceptable electronic medium should also be clearly
defined, but not in a constrictive fashion that precludes future
technological innovations. Finally, so as not to overturn the law of
wills which has functioned relatively well for centuries, a model
statute for electronic wills should include provisions that spell out
the requisite requirements for an acknowledged, attested, and wit-
nessed electronic will that are somewhat analogous to a traditional
conforming will completed in "writing." As a corollary, model legis-
lation should also include a provision addressing electronic wills
that are not witnessed but are akin to nonconforming or holo-
graphic wills. In any instance, the primary purpose of a model
110. See generally C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Re-
form: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement
Toward Amorphism, Part Two: Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503 and a Counterproposa 43 FLA.
L. REV. 599, 716-19 (1991) (calling for adoption of a unified succession act and compara-
tively addressing similar policy concerns as those addressed above).
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electronic wills statute would be to fulfill testamentary intent to the
greatest extent possible.
The model electronic wills statute outlined below attempts to
address these considerations. The model statute clearly articulates
its purpose and rules of construction. It also collects and places key
terms and concepts in a separate definitions section. Substantively,
the model statute would address the execution formalities neces-
sary to create a witnessed electronic will similar to a traditional will
in "writing." Finally, the model statute provides a provision for
"nonconforming" or unwitnessed electronic wills that functionally
are similar to traditional holographic wills.
The proposed model electronic wills statute is provided below
and consists of three parts:
PART I
1-101. Short Title. This Act shall be known and may be cited
as the Electronic Will Act."
4
1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction. 5
(a) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(b) The underlying purposes and policies of this Act
are:
(1) To facilitate the use and enforcement of elec-
tronic and other emerging technology in
memorializing the intent and wishes of a de-
cedent with regard to the distribution of his or
her real and personal property in this state;
(2) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the
affairs of decedents in this state;
(3) To discover and make effective the intent of a
decedent in distribution of his or her property;
and
(4) To promote a speedy and efficient system for
liquidating the estate of the decedent and
making distribution to his or her successors.
114. Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-101 (2006); Electronic Signatures in Global and Na-
tional Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2008). In my model statute I draw primarily
from two sources for guidance: the Uniform Probate Code and the federal e-signature laws.
115. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(a)-(b) (2006).
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PART II
1-201 General Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter, the following terms shall have
the following definitions:
(1) Authentication Attribute
The term "authentication attribute" shall mean an attribute of
a certain person that is unique to that person and that is ca-
pable of measurement and recognition in an electronic
record as a biological aspect of or physical act performed by
that person. An authentication attribute may consist of, but
not be limited to, a fingerprint, a retinal scan, voice recogni-
tion, facial recognition, an electronic signature or other
authentication using a unique characteristic of the person.116
(2) Authoritative Copy
The term "authoritative copy" shall mean the original,




The term "electronic" as it relates to an electronic record
means any technology having electronic, digital, magnetic,
wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.""
(4) Electronic Record
The term "electronic record" means a will that is created,
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored in an
electronic or other medium that is retrievable in perceivable
form. An electronic record shall include, but is not limited to,
data, text, images, sounds, codes, databases, computer pro-
116. Cf NEv. REv. STAr. § 133.085(6)(a) (2007). I have chosen to reword the Nevada
statute to read "authentication attribute" versus "authentication characteristic."
117. Cf. NEv. REV. STAT. § 133.085(6)(b) (2007); see also Beyer and Hargrove, supra note
101, at 891 ("The remaining barrier to full implementation of Nevada's electronic wills stat-
ute is development of software that will ensue that there is only one authoritative copy of the
will and that any copies and/or changes to the original are readily identifiable .... The
developers of the Nevada legislation, developed during the tech boom of the 1990's, antici-
pated that the necessary software would soon be available. Unfortunately, to date, such
software is still not available.") (citations omitted). To alleviate the problem of software crea-
tion and existence the "authoritative copy" requirement could be dispensed with to allow for
immediate adoption of a model electronic wills act.
118. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7006(2) (2007).
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grams, computer hardware, computer software, computer
diskettes, photostats, photographs, slides, motion pictures,
videotapes, audio tapes, records and disks, CD-Rom disks,
DVD disks, electronic mail, voicemail, and any tangible mate-
rial of any nature whatsoever that is designed to preserve the
writing, voice, and image of a person.
(5) Electronic Signature
The term "electronic signature" means a graphical image of a
handwritten signature that is created, generated or stored by
an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically
associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted
by a person with the intent to sign the electronic record.19
(6) Electronic Will
The term "electronic will" shall mean a testamentary docu-
ment that complies with the requirements of this statute.120
(7) Physical Signature
The terms "physical signature" shall mean any symbol or mark
attached to or logically associated with, and executed or
adopted by a person or another person at that person's direc-




3-101. Who May Make An Electronic Will; Effect. Every per-
son age 18 or older who is of sound mind may make an
electronic will to dispose of all of his estate, real and personal,
after payment of the testator's debts.
22
3-102. Execution of Witnessed Electronic Wills.
1. Except as provided in section 3-103, an electronic
will is a will of the testator that must be:
(a) Written, created, recorded, or stored in an
electronic record;12
(b) Contain the date and the physical signature or
electronic signature of the testator and which
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) (2006).
120. See NEv. RE%,. STAT. § 132.119 (2007).
121. SeeUNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a) & cnt Subsection (a) (2006).
122. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (2006); NEV. REv. STAT. § 133.085(2) (2007).
123. SeeNEv. REv. STAT. § 133.085(1)(a) (2007).
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includes, without limitation, at least one au-
thentication attribute of the testator or be
physically signed in the testator's name in writ-
ing or by electronic signature by some other
individual in the testator's conscious presence
and by the testator's direction;2 4 and
(c) Physically signed or witnessed to by the hand-
written or electronic signature of at least two
individuals, each of whom attested within a
reasonable time after he or she witnessed ei-
ther the handwritten or electronic signature of
the electronic will as described in paragraph
(2) by the testator's handwritten signature,
electronic signature, or acknowledgement of
the electronic will.
125
(d) Created, recorded, or stored in manner that:
(1) Only one authoritative copy exists;
(2) The authoritative copy is maintained un-
der the control of the testator or a
custodian designated by the testator -in
the electronic will;
(3) Any attempted alteration of the authorita-
tive copy is readily identifiable; and
(4) Each copy of the authoritative copy is
readily identifiable as a copy that is not
126the authoritative copy.
2. An electronic will shall be deemed to be executed
in this state if the authoritative copy of the elec-
tronic will is:
(a) Transmitted to and maintained by a custo-
dian designated in the electronic will at his
or her place of business in this state or at his
or her residence in this state; or
(b) Maintained by the testator at his place of
business in this state or at his residence in
this state.
127
124. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a) (2) (2006).
125. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a) (3) (2006).
126. SeeNEv. REv. STAT. § 133.085(1)(c) (2007).
127. SeeNEv. REv. STAT. § 133.085(4)(a)-(b) (2007).
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3. An electronic will that meets the requirements of
this section is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of this state. An electronic will is




4. The provisions of this section do not apply to a trust
other than a trust contained in an electronic will.
'29
3-103. Nonconforming Electronic Wills.
(a) A will that does not conform or comply with
section 3-102 is a valid electronic will, whether
or not witnessed, if the handwritten or elec-
tronic signature and material portions of the
document are in an electronic record created
by the testator1
3 °
(b) Intent that the document constitutes the testa-
tor's electronic will can be established by
extrinsic evidence, including, for nonconform-
ing electronic wills, portions of the document
that are not in the testator's handwriting or in
an electronic record created by the testator.'
31
By addressing conforming (witnessed) and nonconforming (un-
witnessed) electronic wills, this proposed legislation would
accomplish the goal of allowing electronic wills without radically
overturning centuries of statutory and common law practice and
precedent. The legislation embraces the ritualistic and formalized
execution methods currently followed for written wills. The stat-
ute's major contribution is that it increases the mediums,
modalities and mechanisms at the disposal of a testator but, the
evidentiary, cautionary, protective, and channeling functions of
traditional will requirements are preserved.
C. A Simple but Overlooked Approach to Adopt Electronic Wills:
Linguistic Changes to Currently Existing Wills Acts
A wholesale adoption of a new wills statute is not always neces-
sary, or practical, to provide for electronically created wills. Many
128. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 133.085(3) (2007).
129. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 133.085(5) (2007).
130. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(b) (2006).
131. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(c) (2006).
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states' wills statutes can be modernized by simply amending the
language of their current wills acts. This approach would enable
states to recognize electronic wills without requiring the adoption
of a new and complex statutory regime. The addition of several
simple words in existing statutes could change the field of wills as
we know it!
In a state like Alabama, for example, with a wills statute modeled
on the Original Uniform Probate Code, the amended statutory
language could read as follows:
§ 43-8-131. Execution and signature of will; witnesses.
Except as provided ... every will shall be in writing or in some
other medium intended to be permanently created, stored, or signed
by the testator or in the testator's name by some other person
in the testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be
signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either
the creation, storage, or signing or the testator's acknowledge-
ment of the creation, storage, or signature of the will.
132
In a state like Michigan, which follows the Revised Uniform Pro-
bate Code, the statute could allow e-wills if modified as follows:
700.2502. Validity of will; holographic will; intent
Sec. 2502.... [A] will is valid only if it is all of the following:
(a) In writing or in some other medium intended to be per-
manently created or stored.
(b) Created, stored, or [s]igned by the testator or in the
testator's name by some other individual in the tes-
tator's conscious presence and by the testator's
direction.
(c) Signed by at least 2 individuals, each of whom
signed within a reasonable time after he or she wit-
nessed either the creation, storage, or signing of the
will as described in subdivision (b) or the testator's
acknowledgement of that creation, storage, or signa-
ture or acknowledgement of the will.'
3 3
132. ALA. CODE § 43-8-131 (1991) (modified as indicated).
133. Micti. Comp. LAws ANN. § 700.2502(1)(a)-(c) (West 2008) (modified as indi-
cated).
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In a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, which follows the
English Statute of Frauds model, the wills act could be revised as
follows to allow for the creation of electronic wills:
§ 18-103. Execution of written will; attestation.
A will or testament ... is void unless it is:
(1) in writing or in some other medium intended to be permanently
created or stored and created, stored, or signed by the testator, or
by another person in his presence and by his express direc-
tion; and
(2) attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator, by
at least two credible witnesses.
13 4
As a final example, in ajurisdiction like Ohio, which follows the
English Wills Act of 1837, the current statute could be revised to
allow for electronic wills by amending as follows:
Method of making will
Except oral wills, every last will and testament shall be in writ-
ing or in some other medium intended to be permanently created or
stored, but may be handwritten or typewritten. Such will shall
be created, stored, or signed at the end by the party making or,
or by some other person in such party's presence and at his
express direction, and be attested and subscribed in the pres-
ence of such party, by two or more competent witnesses, who
saw the testator create, store, or subscribe, or heard him ac-
knowledge his creation, storage, or signature.
3 5
These examples illustrate that through simple amendments the
definition of what constitutes and represents "writing" can easily be
expanded. One need only "play" with the language of each of the
principle types of wills statutes to see that amendments to current
statutes can allow for the recognition of electronic wills. Thus,
without regard to the Original or Revised version of the Uniform
Probate Code, the Statute of Frauds of 1677, or the Wills Act of
1837, the law need not remain anchored to tradition. If state legis-
latures wish to make electronic wills a reality, they often need not
134. D.C. CODE § 18-103 (2008) (modified as indicated).
135. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2008) (modified as indicated).
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look further than amending and expanding upon their existing
wills statutes.
IV. CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS REGARDING ELECTRONIC WILLS
The proposals advanced in this Article may be viewed by some
readers as radical. By embracing technology we lose something we
have all grown accustomed to: a tangible piece of paper that we
can see, touch and feel. Hopefully, this Article will challenge some
legal scholars' and commentators' long held thoughts and opin-
ions in this area of the law and spark a healthy and lively debate
about the future and progression of the law of wills and the proper
role of technology. In this debate over the future, it would be a dis-
service to fail to address and respond to the most common
counterarguments and criticisms of electronic wills. There are two
main arguments leveled against the use of electronic wills. Under-
standably, other perspectives may exist. However, the commentary
below will be confined to two points of criticism: (1) the radical
nature of electronic wills; and (2) the diminished role of the attor-
ney as an advisor and counselor.
A. The Rejection of Formality: The Radicalism of Electronic Wills.
As acknowledged earlier, there will be some who will feel that my
expressions and contribution to this debate are too radical. For
many, the technological, economic, and social barriers impeding
the adoption of electronic wills are insurmountable. 13 For some,
the emergence and acceptance of electronic wills diminishes the
role and importance of will execution formalities that have in-
creased over the centuries to protect testators. For these skeptics,
the adoption of an electronic wills act eviscerates the evidentiary,
cautionary, protective, and channeling functions provided by wills
that are in "writing." Simply, these individuals fear that we would
see an upturn in fraudulent or contested wills.
This Article does not advocate the overthrow of the evidentiary,
cautionary, protective, and channeling functions present in virtu-
ally all wills statutes in this country, as explained in Part Two. As
136. See generally Beyer and Hargrove, supra note 101, at 890-97 (discussing a number of
technological, economic, and social barriers that may influence the embrace of electronic
wills). For example, the authors discuss computer software and hardware issues, social barri-
ers among older clients and attorneys, economic and cost barriers, motivational barriers,
and technology obsolescence barriers among others.
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evidenced by the proposed model statute, we should strive to strike
a balance and preserve these important functions by trying to
maintain a system where "conforming" electronic wills are pre-
ferred to nonconforming wills. Again, under the model statutory
proposal, conceptually, an electronic will in form and substance
closely resembles what already exists for wills in "writing."
Applying the proposed model statue to the hypothetical case of
Ms. Vivian Jones presented in the beginning of this Article, Ms.
Jones would still go to her lawyer's office to consult with her attor-
ney for advice as to how to best plan for the disposition of her
estate. After this consultation, Ms. Jones's attorney could videotape
or audiotape Ms. Jones's plan of disposition-her will. Next, two
witnesses who were either both present during the videotaping or
audio-recording, or who acknowledge the videotape or audiotape
as Ms. Jones's will, would then sign a document stating that they
acknowledge the audio or electronic recording to be Ms. Jones's
will. Alternatively, the witnesses could appear on the videotape or
audio-tape and state their names and acknowledge that they wit-
nessed Ms. Jones creating her will. All of the normal evidentiary,
cautionary, and protective functions that we look for in written
wills are present. The model statute, however, allows Ms. Jones to
validly express her testamentary intent through a wider variety of
mediums, modalities and mechanisms. The model electronic wills
statute proposed, is therefore, not as radical as it might first ap-
pear.
B. The Diminished Role of the Attorney as Advisor and Counselor
A number of legal scholars and commentators may argue that
electronic wills diminish the attorney's role as an advisor and coun-
selor to their estate clients. As such, any statute allowing for
electronic wills may trigger such criticisms. As pointed out above,
however, under the model statute, testators would still need the
legal training and expertise of an attorney to plan the disposition
of their estate. Moreover, this criticism seems to ignore the priority
of upholding testamentary intent. In this debate, we must ask our-
selves what is more important: the ability of the attorney to advise
and counsel their estate client, or that client's capacity to express
their true testamentary wishes? Will testators miss out on advice
and counsel where we allow electronic wills? Will testators make
critical and costly mistakes by "winging it" when creating their own
electronic wills without the assistance of an attorney? Will lawyers
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lose business and clients with the creation and implementation of
electronic wills?
Answers to some of these questions are readily apparent. Over
the past twenty to twenty-five years, we have seen a proliferation of
pre-prepared will forms that are readily available to consumers in
this country. Literally, a person can go to OfficeMax, Office Depot,
Border's, Barnes & Noble, or to numerous other similar stores and
buy office furniture and books as well as a printed form or com-
puter software to guide them through the preparation of their will
in the comfort of their home or office. Internet websites and por-
tals have further increased the number of options that consumers
have at their disposal to create a will without an attorney. Indeed,
these websites and "virtual" portals are proliferating.
137
At the root of this issue, we are forced to ask why individuals re-
frain from seeking the advice and counsel of an attorneys when
preparing their will? There is no simple answer. Individuals turn to
these other sources for a number of reasons. Many are disillu-
sioned or mistrust attorneys. Some individuals feel like they know
just as much as a trained and licensed attorney. In many communi-
ties, attorneys have priced themselves out of the market for average
consumers. Some individuals want the highest level of privacy
when it comes to their personal lives. Some individuals are forced
to deal with death and mortality in ways they do not want to in
preparing their wills. Some clients feel that attorneys overly and
unnecessarily complicate basic but important aspects of will prepa-
ration. In sum, there are a myriad of different reasons why
individuals do not seek the advice and counsel of attorneys when
preparing their wills.
137. See generally FindLaw.com: Estate Planning Forms, http://estate.findlaw.com/estate-
planning/estate-planning-forms/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2008); LegalZoom.com: Last Will and
Testament, http://www.legalzoom.com/sem/willpage.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008); Lega-
cyWriter.com: Wills Created Online, http://www.legacywriter.com/Wills.asp (last visited Sept.
19, 2008); NationalLawforms.com: Last Will and Testament Software, http://
nationallawforms.com/estate/software-last-will-and-testament.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2008);
MakeYourWill.com, http://www.makeyourwill.com/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2008);
IStopLegal.com: Will Forms for All States, http://www.Istoplegal.com/forms/wills.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2008); USLegal: Last Will and Testament, http://www.uslegalforms.com/wills/
(last visited Sept. 19, 2008); We the People: Will, http://www.wethepeopleusa.com/
products.asp?id=77 (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). This is just a sample. If one were to conduct a
Yahoo or Google search using the search term "wills" they would pull up a multitude of sites
with free or paid will forms. Some sites offer consultation while others provide extensive or
slight background information about wills in general. One notable site listed is Legal-
Zoom.com which was co-founded by Robert Shapiro, one of O.J. Simpson's defense attorneys
in his criminal murder trial.
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Interestingly, survey data reveals that between sixty to seventy-
five percent of Americans die intestate. 13 This salient data proves
one simple point: people are not rushing out to seek the advice
and counsel of an attorney to prepare their wills. As a result, attor-
neys will not lose money or potential clients with the introduction
of electronic wills because people are not currently turning to at-
torneys for such services.
While going forward, there will likely be horror stories of indi-
viduals who try to "wing it" on their own by creating an electronic
will that suffers from some level of ambiguity or other technical
deficiency. But this is already happening. Electronic wills would not
exacerbate this issue. 9
One final observation worth noting is that several states offer
statutory will forms to make wills more accessible to their citizens.
This movement started with the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, when in 1984, the Uniform
Statutory Will Act was proposed.140 During the mid-1980s, Califor-
141 142 14 144
nia, Maine, Michigan,43 and Wisconsin introduced statutory
fill-in-the-blank will forms to increase the number of people exe-
cuting wills without the assistance of attorneys.145 This fact further
undermines the notion that the role of an attorney as an advisor or
counselor in will preparation is inviolate. If one of the prime no-
tions of the law of wills is "testamentary freedom,'46 whereby we
strive to honor the testator's wishes, we should seek to make wills
more readily available to a larger audience. Statutory wills are in-
tended to further this basic premise by making wills easier to
obtain by the average citizen. Along this same continuum, the
138. See BEYER, supra note 2, at 14.
139. Electronic wills may prove to be more beneficial than written wills. "Compared to a
written will, the paratextual version is better suited to provide proof of compliance with all
legal formalities, such as testamentary capacity, testamentary intent, and the presence or
absence of undue influence or fraud." Collins & Skover, supra note 17, at 541.
140. The Uniform Statutory Will Act was approved for adoption by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in 1984. However, in 1996,
the NCCUSL withdrew the Uniform Statutory Will Act for enactment because it was deemed
to be obsolete. The Uniform Statutory Will Act was adopted in Massachusetts in 1987 and
New Mexico in 1991. See MASS GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 191B, §§ 1-15 (West 2008); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45-2A-1 to 45-2A-17 (West 2008).
141. CAL. PROB CODE §§ 6200-6243 (West 2008). The actual California statutory will
form can be found at CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (West 2008).
142. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 2-514 (2008).
143. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.123(a)-(c) (West 2008). The specimen statutory will
form can be located at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.123(c) (West 2008).
144. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.50-853.62 (West 2008).
145. See generally Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in-the-Blank Will Forms, PROB. & PROP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 26.
146. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 491.
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model proposal detailed above trumpets the adoption of electronic
wills and furthers the march towards progression and access.
Acknowledging that critics of the model electronic will proposal
might view it as radical, and further that they will question the di-
minished role of the attorney as an advisor or counselor, the basic
counterarguments presented and briefly sketched above, neutral-
ize some of the concerns and criticisms that electronic wills will
likely encounter. Electronic wills are not as radical as they appear.
The model statutory proposal strongly urges for a measured de-
gree of continued formality and embraces doctrines that have
worked in the past. Safeguards are very important. The model elec-
tronic wills proposal intends to bolster and improve the
shortcomings perceived in the current Nevada statute. Finally, if we
consider a testator's ability to make a will through the prism that it
is something to be desired, electronic wills further open the doors
of access for citizens who might otherwise die without a will. As
demonstrated and discussed, the mythical role of the attorney as
an advisor and counselor to estate clients is eroded, questionable,
uncertain, and to some degree, nonexistent for a multitude of rea-
sons.
CONCLUSION
The basic tenet that the law strives to honor testamentary intent
has long been etched in our legal tradition. The ability of a testator
to fully express his testamentary wishes is a goal that we espouse
and desire. As this Article has demonstrated, with regard to will
execution formalities, the legal profession strongly clings to a print
or "Gutenberg Paradigm." Now, with advances in technology, per-
haps the time has arrived to rethink the legal profession's dogmatic
definition of what constitutes "writing" when we envision a will. In
the future, in order to give testators the maximum number of vehi-
cles to articulate their testamentary wishes, the law of wills should
evolve to allow for electronic wills. The ability to devise and be-
queath property in an electronic will is a valuable tool to effectuate
the intent and desires of testators. Nevada has sparked the debate
with passage of the nation's first electronic wills statute. This Arti-
cle builds on Nevada's efforts by providing a model statute that
addresses the perceived flaws in Nevada's first attempt. One thing
is certain: the future lies with Nevada.
Hopefully, as technology advances, the legal profession can be-
gin to move beyond the "Gutenberg Paradigm" in positive ways by
embracing new technologies. "E-Docs," like electronic wills, elec-
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tronic trusts, 147 electronic living wills, 148 electronic donor designa-
tions, and electronic do-not-resituate orders may one day be part of
the estate planning attorney's arsenal. As estate planners often
work with deeds and recordation of property interests, electronic
property recording and electronic deeds may soon be a reality.149
Hopefully, this Article will further the discussion, although legal
and practical considerations will need to be carefully evaluated.
147. Nevada has also moved aggressively in this area as well. In 2001, Nevada passed
electronic trust legislation. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.0015 (2007). I have begun an unpub-
lished manuscript that builds on my discussion in this Article, by exploring the shortcomings
and pitfalls of the Nevada electronic trust statute in similar fashion to this Article.
148. The Terry Schiavo case illustrated the importance of living wills to the general pub-
lic. What if Terry Schiavo had had the legal ability and option and had prepared a
videotaped e-living will? Her desire to live or die would have been assuredly more clearly
and affirmatively manifested. Indeed, having a visible and tangible image would have per-
haps more clearly have assisted the courts in making the most accurate decision. I have
begun an unpublished manuscript that examines e-living wills and their role and place le-
gally in the future.
149. See generally the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, U.R.P.E.R.A.
§§ 1-8 (2005).

